











The essays in this volume explore the nature of time, our God-given medium of ascent, known, 
as Augustine puts it, through the ordered study of the “liberal disciplines that carry the mind 
to the divine (disciplinae liberales intellectum efferunt ad divina)”: grammar and dialectic, for 
example, to promote thinking; geometry and astronomy to grasp the dimensions of our reality; 
music, an invisible substance like time itself, as an exemplary bridge to the unseen substance 
of thoughts, ideas, and the nature of God (theology). This ascending course of study rests on 
procedure, progress, and attainment – on before, following, and afterwards – whose goal is an 
ascending erudition that lets us finally contemplate, as Augustine says in De ordine, our invisible 
medium – time – within time itself:  time is immaterial, but experienced as substantial.  The 
essays here look at projects that chronicle time “from the beginning,” that clarify ideas of 
creation “in time” and “simultaneous times,” and the interrelationships between measured time 
and eternity, including “no-time.”  Essays also examine time as revealed in social and political 
contexts, as told by clocks, as notated in music and embodied in memorializing stone.  In the 
final essays of this volume, time is understood as the subject and medium of consciousness.  
As Adrian Bardon says, “time is not so much a ‘what’ as a ‘ how’”:  a solution to “organizing 
experience and modeling events.”
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chapter 10
Providence, Temporal Authority, and the Illustrious 
Vernacular in Dante’s Political Philosophy
Jason Aleksander
One of the striking features of the metaphysics underpinning the dramatic ele-
ments of Dante’s Divine Comedy may be seen by attending to the difference 
between the way in which the pilgrim and his interlocutors inhabit and per-
ceive time. For instance, near the midpoint of Paradiso the pilgrim himself 
attests to this difference in a question posed to his ancestor Cacciaguida:
O cara piota mia, che sì t’insusi
che, come veggion le terrene menti
non capere in trïangol due ottusi,
così vedit le cose contingenti
anzi che sieno in sé, mirando il punto
a cui tutti li tempi son presenti:
mentre ch’ io era a Virgilio congiunto
su per lo monte che l’anime cura
e discendendo nel mondo defunto,
dette mi fuor di mia vita futura
parole gravi, avvegna ch’ io mi senta
ben tetragono ai colpi di ventura;
per che la voglia mia saria contenta
d’intender qual fortuna mi s’appressa,
ché saetta previsa vien più lenta.
Oh my dear root, who raises yourself so high that, as earthly minds see 
that two obtuse angles cannot fit in a triangle, so you see contingent 
things before they come to be, gazing at the point to which all times are 
present: while I was with Virgil upon the mountain that restores the souls 
and descending into the dead world, grave words were said to me about 
my future life, although I feel prepared well foursquare against the blows 
of events; so my will would be contented to understand what fortune 
approaches me, for the arrow foreseen comes more slowly. [17.13–27]1
1 Italian references to the La Divina Commedia follow the Edizione Nazionale sponsored by the 
Società Dantesca Italiana, ed. Giorgio Petrocchi (Milan, 1966–1967); this edition can be found 
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In short, the pilgrim’s interlocutors in Paradise see all contingent things in the 
temporal world’s past, present, and future by gazing upon them sub specie 
aeternitatis. Dante’s representations of the damned, too, are permitted a 
glimpse of the temporal world under the aspect of eternity, though for them 
the knowledge of either the temporal present in which the pilgrim’s journey 
takes place or the eternal present of the divine mind is crucially absent. Thus, 
as John Freccero has put it in a recent essay devoted to canto 10 of Dante’s 
Inferno, the damned only know a present that is granted to them by the pres-
ence of the pilgrim who, like the drink offered by Odysseus in Book xi of the 
Odyssey, “brings them to ‘life’ momentarily when their static existence inter-
sects his human time.”2
In one sense, then, in his interactions with those in Paradise or Hell, only the 
pilgrim has knowledge of the temporal present, and he is in motion in such a 
way that his motion marks time—a time that corresponds allegorically (as is 
generally recognized in the secondary literature) to the temporal death and 
resurrection of Christ. But while the pilgrim’s cognition of time is that of a 
mortal human, the very fact that his conversations are with those for whom the 
phenomenology of time is quite different suggests that the metaphysics under-
lying the drama of the Commedia is a neo-Platonic one in which time is but the 
image of eternity. Indeed, the very geography of Paradise and Hell in the Com­
media suggest why this must be the case. The damned, for their part, inhabit 
the concentric circles of the underworld. Their motions, if they are permitted 
any motion at all, are a mockery of the motions of the celestial spheres in that 
they are eternal but fruitless. The blessed, by contrast, do not even reside in the 
temporal world but, instead, inhabit the Empyrean beyond the boundaries of 
even the eternal motions of the celestial spheres in which the pilgrim first 
encounters them. Dante even draws explicit attention to this detail when, in 
Paradiso 4.28–48, he has Beatrice resolve the pilgrim’s confusion regarding the 
reflected appearance of these blessed souls within the moving celestial spheres. 
According to her explanation, although all of the blessed truly inhabit the 
Empyrean (beyond time), they are reflected in specific celestial spheres according 
to an allegorical logic that signals the nature and extent of their spiritual exem-
plarity. In fact, perhaps the only souls that the Pilgrim encounters in his jour-
ney through the afterlife whose cognition of time resembles his are those 
purging themselves of sin on Mount Purgatory. The physical geography of this 
region, after all, differs from that of the other regions in two crucial respects: 
online at both the Dartmouth and Princeton Dante Project websites. English translations are 
my own.
2 “Epitaph for Guido: ‘Inferno’ X,” Religion and Literature 39/3 (2007), 1–29 (12).
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(1)  it is fundamentally an earthly geography in which the pilgrim’s and the 
penitents’ cognition of time is reinforced, for instance, by the apparent motion 
of the sun; and (2) the penitent motions of its inhabitants are fundamentally 
the mixed motions of a spiral (combining both circular and linear motion) as 
they travel both around the mountain and up to the summit.
Moreover, to the extent that one reads the Commedia as assuming the pos-
sibility of a human experience of happiness in the state described in Paradiso, 
the tension between the phenomenology of earthly time and its metaphysi-
cally imitative relationship to the reality of the eternal presence of the 
Divine—an eternal presence that is both in the temporal world and beyond 
it—fundamentally undergirds the allegorical purpose of the Commedia. On 
this reading, time is a feature of human fallenness. Consequently, it is only 
through the temporal striving for the Good that a human being becomes capa-
ble of receiving, through the grace of God, the eternal blessedness that would 
repair that fallen condition. Nevertheless, because the fallen world remains the 
image in the likeness of the eternal and unchanging model on which it is cre-
ated, the cautious interpreter can read each specific fate of the damned, the 
penitent, and the blessed as indicative of the same providential ordering of 
human history; that is, each moment of every fate is a sign of the eternal pres-
ence of the divine in the world. Indeed, in Purgatorio 22, Dante, through his 
representation of the Roman poet Statius, suggests that, because of this provi-
dential ordering of human history, even a pagan poet like Virgil can guide oth-
ers to Christianity:
Facesti come quei che va di notte,
che porta il lume dietro e sé non giova,
ma dopo sé fa le persone dotte,
quando dicesti: “Secol si rinova;
torna giustizia e primo tempo umano,
e progenïe scende da ciel nova.”
You did as one who goes at night, who carries the lamp behind and does 
not benefit from it, but teaches the people who follow when you said: 
“The age turns new; justice returns and the first human time, and a new 
progeny descends from heaven.” [67–72]3
3 Indeed, Purgatorio 21–22 suggest that Virgil’s poetry has a greater capacity to guide others to 
Christianity than that of Statius, for even though Virgil is a pagan and lacks the faith that 
would be necessary for salvation, he was in life, unlike Statius, free of any moral defects (see 
Inferno 4.34–42). I discuss some of the philosophical implications of Dante’s depiction of the 
 Please check and approve the edit made of Running head.
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That Virgil is able to do this even though he cannot himself attain spiritual 
salvation should not surprise the attentive reader since, for Dante, the greater 
one’s intellectual capacity, the greater is one’s ability to see in each and every 
creature and event the providential structure of history—thus representations 
of the souls of the damned and saved alike are, in the Commedia, signs of 
“quella fede che vince ogne errore” (that faith that vanquishes every error 
[Inferno 4.48]). It should not be surprising, therefore, that a poet of Virgil’s abil-
ity and wisdom is able to grasp and signify a greater part of the truth than even 
that of which he himself is aware. Indeed, this conclusion is also suggested by 
Virgil’s own comment that the merits of Homer, Horace, Ovid, and Lucan win 
them some (limited) degree of grace even in Hell (see Inferno 4.78).
In light of these brief glimpses of some of the Commedia’s metaphysical pre-
suppositions, this essay intends to explore how Dante’s ethico-political phi-
losophy operates within the crucial tension between the phenomenology of 
time as the condition for the possibility of human moral development and also 
as, metaphysically speaking, the privation and imitation of eternity. Rather 
than focus on the Commedia itself—a text which is structured by this tension 
in both its philosophical assumptions as well as the narrative and dramatic 
logic through which its fiction operates—this essay confines itself in what fol-
lows to a discussion of how Dante’s understanding of time structures his 
 ethico-political philosophy articulated in his three major philosophical trea-
tises: De vulgari eloquentia, Convivio, and Monarchia. I will begin with a discus-
sion of Dante’s definition of the illustrious vernacular in De vulgari eloquentia: 
I will argue that Dante’s understanding of the poetic and rhetorical function 
of  the illustrious vernacular is tied to his political philosophy in a way that 
depends upon a rich but ultimately unresolved tension between (a) the 
demand that only an atemporal, unchanging vernacular would be suitable for 
the tasks of universal monarchy and (b) the recognition that only a temporal, 
localized, and changing illustrious vernacular could possibly bring about the 
existence of the universal monarchy.
In the second half of the essay, I will turn to Dante’s treatment of the prov-
idential grounding for the independence of spiritual and temporal authority 
in Convivio and Monarchia: I will argue that Dante’s understanding of divine 
providence provides common justification for the temporal and spiritual 
authorities whose independence he otherwise insists upon. Then, drawing 
on the letter to Cangrande della Scala (the authorship of which is disputed), 
relationship between Virgil and Statius in “The Aporetic Ground of Revelation’s Authority in 
the Divine Comedy and Dante’s Demarcation and Defense of Philosophical Authority,” Essays 
in Medieval Studies 26 (2010), 1–14.
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I will discuss how, for Dante, the providential ground for the legitimacy of 
temporal authority can only be discerned through the allegorical interpreta-
tion of history itself. In light of my discussion of these themes in Dante’s 
political philosophy and its dependence on his understanding of divine 
providence, I will conclude with a brief reflection on how Dante’s under-
standing of divine providence might help us better appreciate important 
aspects of the neglected legacy of Renaissance humanism in the history of 
early modern philosophy.
 Political Authority and the Illustrious Vernacular
In Renaissance Humanism: Studies in Philosophy and Poetics, Ernesto Grassi 
points out that Dante’s understanding of the nature of the illustrious vernacu-
lar harbors an indissoluble tension. On the one hand, Dante’s political philoso-
phy endorses the rule of a universal monarch who, “unlike the individual kings, 
rules the whole world, and whose task consists of preventing any alteration in 
the eternal order established and politically institutionalized by way of intel-
lectual insight.”4 Accordingly, Dante’s philosophy of language requires for such 
a political state the possibility of a universal language that “in its universality 
and abstraction, avoids all local and temporal variations” (p. 7). Dante, how-
ever, also ascribes to the vernacular-poetic function of language the role of a 
tool necessary for concretely disclosing the “historical range of his nation” 
(p.  9) and for temporally bringing about the political unity of the universal 
monarch. In this section I will discuss why this tension arises in Dante’s phi-
losophy of language and how it depends upon Dante’s understanding of the 
providentially guided unfolding of human history.
In De vulgari eloquentia, a work which was probably begun around 1302 and 
abandoned sometime around 1305, Dante defines vernacular language as
eam qua infantes assuefiunt ab assistentibus, cum primitus distinguere 
voces incipiunt; vel quod brevius dici potest, vulgarem locutionem asseri-
mus, quam sine omni regula, nutricem imitantes, accipimus.
that which infants acquire from those around them when they first begin 
to distinguish sounds; or, to put it more succinctly, I declare that  vernacular 
4 Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies 51, trans. Walter F. Veit (Binghamton, 1988), 
pp. 6–7.
0002638771.INDD   235 2/1/2016   4:54:52 PM
Aleksander236
301678
language is that which we learn without any formal instruction, by imi-
tating our nurses. [1.1.2]5
Thus, vernacular language is distinguished from grammar, which is a “locutio 
secundaria” (secondary kind of language) possessed by the Romans and Greeks 
and others, “sed non omnes” (but not by all [1.1.3]).6 Unlike vernacular lan-
guage, these grammars are a product of art and can only be acquired through 
the cultivation of a habitus in a dedicated study of its rules and doctrines (1.1.3). 
And also, as he explains in 1.9, unlike vernacular language, grammar
nichil aliud est quam quedam inalterabilis locutionis ydemptitas diversi-
bus temporibus atque locis…nulli singulari arbitrio videtur obnoxia, et 
per consequens nec variabilis esse potest.
is nothing less than a certain immutable identity of language in different 
times and places…[and] subject to no individual will; and, as a result, it 
cannot change. [1.9.11]
In relation to this distinction, Dante argues in 1.1 for the superiority of the ver-
nacular language—and here it will also help to note that Dante treats the 
modes of the vernacular as if they belong to a single species of language—for 
three reasons:
Tum quia prima fuit humano generi usitata; tum quia totus orbis ipsa 
perfruitur, licet in diversas prolationes et vocabula sit divisa; tum quia 
naturalis est nobis, cum illa potius artificialis existat.
First, because it was the language originally used by the human race; 
 second because the whole world employs it, though with different 
5 Latin references are to De vulgari eloquentia, ed. Pier Vincezo Mengaldo (Padua, 1968). 
Translations are those of Steven Botterill (Cambridge, uk, 2005).
6 The term secundaria may imply in this context that it is a “second-rate” or “inferior” language 
as well as a kind of language that can only develop after one acquires a vernacular. One of the 
most common mistakes in interpretations of De vulgari eloquentia is to suppose that Dante 
believed that Romans and Greeks had only this secondary kind of language—that there were 
never Latin or Greek vernaculars. It seems clear to me, however, that Dante must recognize 
that there were Latin and Greek vernaculars before there were developed Latin and Greek 
grammars. In any case, as a matter of the logical claim here, Dante is saying that not all cul-
tures have grammars, not that the Greeks and Romans only had grammars.
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 pronunciations and using different words; and third, because it is natural 
to us, while the other is, in contrast, artificial. [1.1.4]
For Dante, despite the superiority of the vernacular over grammar, the very 
diversity of modes of the vernacular indicates its deficiency. Specifically, Dante 
argues that no existing mode of the vernacular is a language that, in any of its 
specific, municipal varieties—varieties that differ by convention—is perfectly 
equipped to produce or express virtues consistent with any of the ends of 
human nature. On behalf of this argument, Dante first appears to proceed 
empirically by means of a hunt for a perfect mode of the vernacular among 
roughly fourteen existing municipal forms of the Italian mode of the vernacu-
lar. Although I’ll indicate below why we must regard this supposedly empirical 
hunt as a fantasy, it is worth noting a few of the deficiencies that he says mark 
the failures of existing municipal forms of the Italian mode of the vernacular. 
For instance, in 1.11, Dante judges the “tristiloquium” (vile jargon) of the con-
temporary inhabitants of Rome to be the “turpissimum” (ugliest) of all species 
of Italian expression and not even worthy of being called a vernacular. And, he 
adds, “nec mirum, cum etiam morum habituumque deformitate pre cunctis 
videantur fetere” (this should come as no surprise, for they also stand out 
among all Italians for the ugliness of their manners and their outward appear-
ance [1.11.2]). Other local vernaculars fare little better. For instance, Dante 
writes that, when it comes to the Tuscans, it is evident that that their “turpilo-
quium” (foul jargon [1.13.3]) is little better than that of the Romans.
Dante’s discussion of these Italian modes of the vernacular indicates two 
significant features of his philosophy of language. First, that Dante associates 
the vileness of custom with a corresponding deformity of the vernacular sug-
gests that he also maintains that one’s idiomatic language and one’s ethico-
political dispositions are highly correlated. Accordingly, for Dante the task of 
cultivating a virtuous person or a just state corresponds to the use of, or culti-
vation of, a virtuous mode of the vernacular. Second, what is significant about 
Dante’s judgments regarding these modes of the vernacular (as well as the 
rules he provides in book two for the composition of poetry in the illustrious 
vernacular) is that he speaks on behalf of a universal authority, that is, as if he 
possesses an a priori knowledge of the underlying eternal form of the illustri-
ous vernacular—when evaluating the aesthetic expression of the diverse exist-
ing modes of the vernacular. For instance:
Si quis autem quod de Tuscis asserimus de Ianuensibus asserendum non 
putet, hoc solum in mente premat, quod si per oblivionem Ianuenses 
amitterent z licteram, vel mutire totaliter eos, vel novam reparare  oporteret 
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loquelam. Est enim z maxima pars eorum locutionis: que quidem lictera 
non sine multa rigiditate profertur.
If there is anyone who thinks that what I have just said about the Tuscans 
could not be applied to the Genoese, let him consider only that if, through 
forgetfulness, the people of Genoa lost the use of the letter z, they would 
either have to fall silent for ever or invent a new language for themselves. 
For z [constitutes] the greater part of their vernacular, and it is, of course, 
a letter that cannot be pronounced without considerable harshness. [1.13, 
translation altered.]
There is probably no reason to dispute Dante’s characterization of the pho-
netic or ethical quality of the letter z, but the passage suggests two interest-
ing questions that correspond with my observations above. First, why would 
a phonetic feature of a particular mode of the vernacular have anything to 
do with ethical considerations? Second, on what authority is Dante entitled 
to the judgment that an illustrious mode of the vernacular would not fre-
quently include this phoneme? At the level of the question of the grounds 
for his competence as an authority7 capable of judging particular vernacu-
lars Dante’s argument can only be that the reason why any particular feature 
of a mode of the vernacular fails to produce or express the virtues pertinent 
to human ends is that it is a corrupted imitation of a timeless illustrious 
vernacular. However, as we shall see, it also turns out that the only non-
corrupted imitation of this illustrious vernacular must itself be subject to 
local variation in response to the present needs of a particular political 
community.
In De vulgari eloquentia, Dante never explicitly makes such an argument. 
Consequently, to understand why this interpretation of Dante’s philosophy of 
language is warranted requires beginning with a consideration of how he car-
ries out his argument that the variability of municipal modes of the vernacular 
indicates their imperfection through a phylogenetic investigation of the ori-
gins of the modes of the vernacular language. In De vulgari eloquentia 1.3, 
7 Albert Russell Ascoli’s recent Dante and the Making of a Modern Author (Cambridge, uk, 
2009) provides a masterful analysis of Dante’s appeals to and transformations of a variety of 
traditional understandings of “authority.” My own claims about Dante’s conception of 
authority in this context are much more limited, and I am ultimately more concerned with 
Dante’s philosophical understanding of the grounds of authority in aesthetic/political judg-
ment than with the complicated rhetorical and dialectical processes through which Dante 
marshals and deploys this authority.
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Dante maintains that humans are defined by having been endowed with ver-
nacular language since, unlike other animals and also unlike angels,
Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandas inter se conceptiones 
suas aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere; quia, cum de ratione 
accipere habeat et in rationem portare, rationale esse oportuit; cumque 
de una ratione in aliam nichil deferri possit nisi per medium sensuale, 
sensuale esse oportuit.
So it was necessary that the human race, in order for its members to com-
municate their conceptions among themselves, should have some [sign] 
based on reason and perception. Since this [sign] needed to receive its 
content from reason and convey it back, it had to be rational; but since 
nothing can be conveyed from one reasoning mind to another except by 
means…[of] the senses, it had also to be based on [the senses]. [1.3.2, 
translation altered]
The endowment of the vernacular is thus interpreted as a divine gift since, 
“divinitus in nobis esse credendum est quod in actu nostrorum affectuum ordi-
nato letamur” (we may believe that our joy in the ordered activity of our affects 
is of divine origin [1.5.2, translation mine]). And, according to Dante, this 
accords with the account of Genesis since the original human language, the 
language of Adam, was given to mankind by God so that human beings would 
be capable of glorifying “ipse qui gratis dotaverat” (He who had freely given so 
great a gift [1.5.2]).
This original vernacular, Dante claims, was a “certam formam locutionis a 
Deo cum anima prima concreatam fuisse” (certain form of language created 
by God along with the first soul [1.6.4]). It was spoken by Adam and by 
“omnes posteri eius usque ad edificationem turris Babel” (all his descen-
dents until the building of the Tower of Babel [1.6.5]). And, had it not been 
for human presumption, “omnis lingua loquentium uteretur” (would have 
continued to be used by all speakers [1.6.4]). After the confusion, it was used 
only by the Hebrews, “ut Redemptor noster, qui ex illis oriturus erat secun-
dum humanitatem, non lingua confusionis, sed gratie, frueretur” (so that 
our redeemer, who was to descend from them, insofar as He was human, 
should not speak the language of confusion, but that of grace [1.6.6]). 
According to this view, the cause of the imperfection and diversity of human 
language would not be the original fall from grace of Adam and Eve, but only 
the later hubris that had compelled Nimrod and his followers to construct 
the Tower of Babel.
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Specific aspects of the De vulgari eloquentia’s discussion of language are 
later altered in Dante’s treatment of the subject in the Commedia. For instance, 
in Paradiso 26, Adam himself explains that:
La lingua ch’io parlai fu tutta spenta
innanzi che a l’ovra inconsummabile
fosse la gente di Nembròt attenta.
The language that I spoke was entirely extinct before the people of 
Nimrod turned their attention to that unattainable work. [124–126, 
italics mine]
In light of this discrepancy, it may be that Dante simply “changed his mind,” as 
Umberto Eco puts it,8 about the origins of the diversity of vernacular modes. It 
is, in any case, clear that the later view is that “born of humanity’s natural dis-
position towards speech, languages may split, grow and change through human 
intervention. According to Adam, the Hebrew spoken before the building of 
the tower…was not the same as the Hebrew spoken in the earthly paradise” 
(Eco, p. 47).
But even though Eco is correct that Paradiso provides a different conclusion 
about the origins of the differentiation of the vernacular modes from each 
other, such a view is not at odds with the metaphysical presuppositions of De 
vulgari eloquentia. In the earlier work, as Eco is aware, Dante explains that the 
forma locutionis of the original vernacular is a form in respect to “quantum ad 
rerum vocabula et quantum ad vocabulorum constructionem et quantum ad 
constructionis prolationem” (words used for things, and to the construction of 
words, and to the arrangement of the construction [1.6.4]). Eco points out that 
this statement allows the inference that, “by forma locutionis, Dante refers to a 
lexicon and a morphology and, consequently, a determined language” (p. 42). 
But while the De vulgari eloquentia seems to allow the interpretation that this 
“determined language” was spoken, as Hebrew, not only until the building of 
the Tower of Babel, but even afterwards, Eco insists that the text requires a 
more nuanced interpretation. According to Eco, when Dante writes “hac forma 
locutionis locutus est Adam” (In this form of language Adam spoke [1.6.5]), one 
must interpret Dante as suggesting that the activity of speaking “constructs” 
the Hebrew language not as a “determined language,” but as a language that 
is  temporally changing and so only contextually determinate as regards the 
8 “The Perfect Language of Dante,” in The Search for a Perfect Language, trans. James Fentress 
(Oxford, 1995), pp. 34–52.
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relationships between words and things.9 And, according to Eco, this interpre-
tation is to be favored because, later in this same passage, Dante uses lingua 
rather than forma locutionis when speaking of the Hebrew spoken by Jesus. 
Moreover, such an interpretation is warranted by the final sentence of 1.6, 
where Dante writes that “Hebraicum ydioma illud quod primi loquentis labia 
fabricarunt” (the Hebrew language was that which the lips of the first speaker 
[fashioned]).10 In short, for Eco, the forma locutionis of the De vulgari eloquen­
tia “was neither the Hebrew language nor the general faculty of language, but 
a particular gift from God to Adam that was lost after Babel. It is the lost gift 
that Dante sought to recover through his theory of an illustrious vernacular” 
(p. 43). Consequently, even though Paradiso offers what appears to be a differ-
ent account of the origins of the municipal modes of the vernacular, both the 
Divine Comedy and the De vulgari eloquentia allow similar conclusions about 
the relationship of these modes of vernacular to the original forma lucutionis 
of the human vernacular.
Similarly, although I will confine my remaining remarks about the illustri-
ous vernacular to a discussion of the De vulgari eloquentia, both it and the 
Divine Comedy allow the same conclusions about Dante’s understanding of the 
role that an illustrious mode of the vernacular would play in political life. That 
is, both texts support the conclusion that, regardless of when human ver-
naculars became species differentiated by convention from the original, pre- 
political forma locutionis, an “illustre, cardinale, aulicum et curiale” (illustrious, 
cardinal, aulic, and curial [1.16.6]) vernacular would be a mode of the vernacu-
lar that, in its lived, temporally changing modes of expression, approaches the 
perfection that pertains to the original forma locutionis. As Dante insists in 
De vulgari eloquentia 2.1–2, the illustrious vernacular ought not be used by all 
9 Both “constructs” and “determined language,” as terms employed in Fentress’ translation 
of Eco’s text, connote a modern understanding that may not be fully consistent with 
Dante’s meaning. I have left these terms unaltered here and below when citing Eco’s text. 
In relation to “determined language” it seems clear to me that Eco is speaking of a lan-
guage in which there is an unchanging, universally determined relationship between 
word (verbum) and thing (res). In a temporal mode of the vernacular, however, the rela-
tionship between word and thing could not, according to Dante’s argument, be deter-
mined universally/atemporally: because this relationship for temporal modes of the 
vernacular is structured by convention, it would be determinate only contextually.
10 Translation altered. In Fentress’ translation of Eco’s text, this sentence is rendered as 
 follows: “It was thus the Hebrew tongue that was constructed by the first being endowed 
with speech” (p. 43). This translation is also consistent with the Latin sentence, and it cor-
rectly emphasizes the fact that Dante is not speaking of Hebrew as a forma locutionis but 
as a lived, temporally changing language. Here fabricarunt is translated as “constructed.”
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writers, but only by those who possess both scientia et ingenium,11 that is, by 
those who possess both knowledge and genius (dve 2.1.8). In the mouths of 
these rightful users, the illustrious vernacular would be a language that would 
express and produce the virtues that correspond to the tripartite aspects of a 
human soul: prowess in arms, which pertains to the vegetal part of the soul’s 
determination to seek that which is useful; love, which pertains to a rectitude 
of the appetitive or animal part of the soul; and rectitude of will, which per-
tains to the rational part of the soul. That such a language can produce these 
virtues is precisely what Dante means in 1.17 when he calls such a language 
“illustrious” since such a language, by giving off light or reflecting the light it 
receives from elsewhere, is exalted by mastery and power, that is, the illustri-
ous vernacular is equipped to rule because it is capable of changing human 
hearts so as to “nolentem volentem et volentem nolentem faciat” (make the 
unwilling willing and the willing unwilling [1.17.4]). And, in 1.18, he explains 
that such a language is cardinalis (cardinal or pivotal) because it “platant” 
(plants) what is best and peculiar to the local vernaculars and “extirpat” 
(removes) what is disreputable. It is “aulicus” (aulic or courtly) because “est ut 
omnibus sit comune nec proprium ulli” (it is common to all yet owned by none 
[1.18.2]). And it is “curialis” (curial) because it has been weighed by the scales of 
justice in a court unified either under the rule of a singular monarch (e.g., 
judged in a unified court such as that of the King of Germany) or, as is the case 
for the Italians, who lack a unified court in the former sense, according to a 
court unified “gratioso lumine rationis” (by the gracious light of reason [1.18.5]). 
This last criterion seems also to require that such a vernacular express what is 
necessary, that is, “what cannot be expressed otherwise” (Eco, p. 46), since: 
“quia curialitas nil aliud est quam librata regula eorum que peragenda sunt” 
(the essence of being curial is no more than providing a balanced assessment 
of whatever had to be dealt with [1.18.4]). To this extent, it would share with 
Adamic language the capacity to express a primordial affinity between word 
and thing.
It is in light, then, of Dante’s discussion of the relationship between the 
illustrious vernacular and Adamic language that we can see in what sense 
Grassi was right to emphasize the tension between Dante’s insistence that the 
authority of such a mode of the vernacular derives from its resemblance to an 
11 Dante’s use of the subjunctive in this context seems to me more than a bit misleading. 
When he asks whether all poets should be permitted to use this language, the question 
seems to imply that it would be possible for them to do so. But if the account that I am 
offering here is correct, it would in fact only be possible for those who ought to use such a 
language actually to do so.
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unchanging forma locutionis and, at the same time, his insistence that such a 
language function temporally as a political tool for bringing about the stable 
rule of a universal monarch. This tension between the universal, atemporal, 
transhistorical authority of an illustrious vernacular and its intrinsically local-
ized context of signification12 constrains how Dante must address the question 
raised earlier concerning the grounds of his authority to judge the diversity of 
Italian municipal vernaculars. In the first place, “cardinality,” for instance, 
would seem to be a criterion that establishes what is most just with respect to 
a particular context, that is, according to this interpretation, the cardinality of 
an illustrious vernacular would pertain not to its universal authority but to its 
suitability to produce justice in particular political contexts. Indeed, it is telling 
that in Dante’s discussion of cardinality, the Bolognese receive the greatest 
admiration. He judges this municipal vernacular to be closest to an illustrious 
vernacular because it judges other Italian forms and appropriates what is best 
in them and dispenses with what is not. However, as will become clear, even in 
this instance, Dante implicitly maintains that such pivotal judgments about 
what to fetch and what to remove are possible only by reference to an underly-
ing principle of universal authority.
I will discuss Dante’s understanding of political authority in greater detail in 
the second half of this essay. However, even at this point in the discussion of 
his philosophy of language, it should be clear that his understanding of justice 
in its relation to the authority of a universal monarch departs significantly 
from Aristotle’s understanding of justice as a virtue that can pertain only to a 
particular political constitution (it is worth noting that, for Aristotle, there are 
both just and unjust versions of different political constitutions). At the same 
time, however, Dante does acknowledge explicitly in Monarchia 1.14.5 that 
there must be variations of customs even within a universal monarchy. Thus, 
even where his political theory differs so markedly from Aristotle’s, he never-
theless recognizes that even an illustrious vernacular must function in local 
contexts of signification that differ with respect to time and place.
A more revealing key to Dante’s attitude about what grounds the authority 
to judge vernacular languages may be found in his selection of examples of 
those who write in a vernacular that most closely approaches the illustrious. 
All of the authors that Dante cites in a positive regard depart from the munici-
pal vernacular that is native for them. More importantly, Dante explicitly draws 
12 This tension is also discussed—to different ends—in Albert Russell Ascoli, “‘Neminem 
ante nos’: Historicity and Authority in the De vulgari eloquentia,” Annali d’Italianistica 8 
(1991), 186–231; and Zygmunt G. Barański, “‘Significar per verba’: Notes on Dante and 
Plurilingualism,” The Italianist 6 (1986), 5–18.
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attention to the significance of his own exile as a feature pertinent to his ability 
to judge in the name of a universal authority:
Quicunque tam obscene rationis est ut locum sue nationis delitiosissi-
mum credat esse sub sole, hic etiam pre cunctis proprium vulgare licetur, 
idest maternam locutionem, et per consequens credit ipsum fuisse illud 
quod fuit Ade. Nos autem, cui mundus est patria velut piscibus equor, 
quanquam Sarnum biberimus ante dentes et Florentiam adeo diligamus 
ut, quia dileximus, exilium patiamur iniuste, rationi magis quam sensui 
spatulas nostri iudicii podiamus.
Whoever is so misguided as to think that the place of his birth is the most 
delightful spot under the sun may also believe that his own language—
his mother tongue, that is—is pre-eminent among all others; and, as a 
result he may believe that his language was also Adam’s. To me, however, 
the world is a homeland, like the sea to fish—though I drank from the 
Arno before cutting my teeth, and love Florence so much that, because 
I loved her, I suffer exile unjustly—and I will weight the balance of my 
judgment more with reason than with sentiment. [1.6.2–3]
In relation to the question of the universal grounds of authority, this comment 
suggests that the very condition for the possibility of evaluating diverse modes 
of the vernacular is “exile”13 or estrangement from any particular mode of the 
vernacular. Moreover, such an exile is also necessary for acquiring an illustri-
ous mode of the vernacular since it would be impossible to acquire a perfect 
language within any particular political community already deformed by local, 
imperfect conventions. Thus, Dante’s unjust exile from the imperfect commu-
nity of Florence suggests a reversal of Adam’s exile from Eden, an interpreta-
tion that is also justified by the fact that in this same section Dante proceeds 
from this comment on his own suitability to judge Italian vernaculars immedi-
ately to a discussion of the forma locutionis of Adamic language.14 From this, it 
13 The significance of “exile” in Dante’s philosophy of language receives extensive treatment 
in Marianne Shapiro’s De vulgari eloquentia: Dante’s Book of Exile (Lincoln, 1990).
14 Moreover, that Dante, out of love, suffers this exile from the imperfect (fallen) community 
also perhaps suggests a Christological feature of his thought on this point. If so, Dante’s 
understanding of the possibility of reclaiming a perfect language is also clearly messianic 
(in the sense of Christian messianism): such a language would be a language appropriate 
only for a redeemed humanity and would require the unification of the ethical and spiri-
tual ends of human existence.
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becomes clear that illustriousness, cardinality, courtliness, and curiality apply 
to the illustrious vernacular universally and independently of the conventions 
of a local political context. Or, put differently, the illustrious vernacular is a 
mode of the vernacular language that must function within a local political 
context in order to produce virtue in citizens through particular political con-
ventions and habits, but its own authority to do so depends on or relates to that 
of universal political authority. In short, the illustrious vernacular could only 
be a language appropriate for a universal monarch who rules all local commu-
nities with the same authority, that is, the mode of the vernacular that corre-
sponds most fully to the original, timeless and unchanging forma locutionis. 
Thus, beyond the aesthetic evaluations of specific defective features of the 
Italian modes of the vernacular noted earlier, the underlying principle accord-
ing to which Dante judges all local modes of the vernacular as unequipped to 
produce or express the virtues pertinent even to earthly ends of human exis-
tence is that the illustrious vernacular must, in principle, serve the authority of 
the universal Monarch, and so, in each specific contemporary context, it must 
be whatever municipal mode of the vernacular that is most appropriate for the 
task of guiding a people to natural human felicity insofar as it is possible.
A last comment on the universality of this illustrious vernacular is in order, 
however. As I pointed out at the beginning of this section, Dante distinguishes 
between all vernaculars and all grammars in part on the basis of the mutability 
of all species of vernacular and the immutability of all species of grammar. 
That is, although the purpose and authority that underwrite the employment 
of an illustrious mode of the vernacular is itself unchanging—and so, in this 
sense, constitutes its authority over all human beings—the purpose of this 
authority to affect the will(s) of any of its subjects requires that the extrinsic 
manifestations of this vernacular be temporally subject to change. First, this 
illustrious vernacular must be local in its range of signification so that it is 
meaningful to those who hear it. Second, the actual signs employed by such a 
vernacular must also be mutable in relationship to the specific temporal needs 
of specific political communities, even of the specific temporal needs in a uni-
versal political community. In other words, the illustrious vernacular is what-
ever vernacular is used by one who is endowed with the ability to lead human 
beings from a condition of ethical and/or spiritual failure to a condition of 
ethical felicity and/or spiritual blessedness. In truth, then, the illustrious ver-
nacular is an unchanging language only in the sense that, when it is employed 
by one capable of using it, the purpose and authority of linguistic expression is 
properly attentive to the universal needs of human nature. That is, the illustri-
ous vernacular is the language used by one for whom the events of mundane 
history are recognized as the de jure unfolding of divine providence ordering 
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all things in time toward the same universal end. Thus, this vernacular, like the 
manifestations of the souls of the blessed in the celestial spheres to which 
Beatrice refers in Paradiso 4, is accommodated to the specific needs of its audi-
ence in a particular time and place, but the authority of a speaker of such a 
language to deploy this vernacular is grounded in the speaker’s understanding 
of the necessity of the unfolding of contingent events from an eternal, provi-
dential authority. In light of this recognition, then, I will discuss Dante’s under-
standing of political authority in greater detail in the second half of this essay.
 Divine Providence as Grounds for Temporal Authority
There are two fundamental principles that ground Dante’s political philoso-
phy: one is psychological, the other cosmological. The psychological principle, 
articulated succinctly in the last section of Monarchia, is that the human being, 
“solus inter omnia entia in duo ultima ordinetur, quorum alterum sit finis eius 
prout corruptibilis est, alterum vero prout incorruptibilis” (alone among all 
beings is ordered to two ultimate goals, one of them being his goal as a corrupt-
ible being, the other his goal as an incorruptible being [Monarchia 3.16.6]).15 
This principle is sufficient for Dante’s demonstrating the necessity of the inde-
pendence of temporal and spiritual authority. However, for Dante the very fact 
that the human being is ordained to these two goals by its creator implies that 
his cosmological conception of divine justice is the more fundamental of the 
principles of his political philosophy. From this more fundamental principle, 
Dante derives the conclusion that temporal authority no less than spiritual 
authority derives from the providential unfolding through human history of 
divine justice in the world:
Cumque dispositio mundi huius dispositionem inherentem celorum cir-
culationi sequatur, necesse est ad hoc ut utilia documenta libertatis et 
pacis commode locis et temporibus applicentur, de curatore isto dispen-
sari ab Illo qui totalem celorum dispositionem presentialiter intuetur. 
Hic autem est solus ille qui hanc preordinavit, ut per ipsam ipse prov-
idens suis ordinibus queque connecteret. Quod si ita est, solus eligit Deus, 
solus ipse confirmat, cum superiorem non habeat…. Sic ergo patet quod 
auctoritas temporalis Monarche sine ullo medio in ipsum de Fonte 
 universalis auctoritatis descendit.
15 All references to the Latin are from Prue Shaw’s edition of the Cambridge Medieval 
Classics series (Cambridge, uk, 1995); translations are also Shaw’s.
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And since the disposition of this world is a result of the disposition inher-
ent in the circling of the heavens, in order that useful teachings concern-
ing freedom and peace can be applied appropriately to times and places, 
it is necessary for provision for this protector to be made by Him who 
takes in at a glance the whole disposition of the heavens. For he alone is 
the one who preordained this disposition, making provision through it to 
bind all things in due order. If this is so, then God alone chooses, he alone 
confirms, since he has none above him. Thus it is evident then that the 
authority of the temporal monarch flows down into him without any 
intermediary from the Fountainhead of universal authority. [3.16.12–15]
In Convivio, an unfinished treatise composed circa 1304–130716 in which he had 
also discussed these issues, Dante also makes clear why it is that he maintains 
that “non da forza fu principalmente preso per la romana gente, ma da divina 
provedenza, che è sopra ogni ragione” (this office, then, was obtained by the 
Roman people not principally by means of force, but by divine providence, 
which is the ultimate ground of all reason [4.4.11]).17 Dante advances this argu-
ment as a response to the hypothetical objection that the Roman emperors—
the paradigm for Dante’s Emperor—obtained rule not by reason or right but 
by force. Dante’s response, simply stated, is to admit that force may have been 
the instrumental cause that allowed for the establishment of Roman imperial 
authority, but that the moving or efficient cause was divine reason itself just as, 
by analogy,
16 De vulgari eloquentia was probably composed in 1303–1305, but was abandoned before its 
completion. There was probably some overlap between the periods in which Dante was 
working on both the De vulgari eloquentia and Convivio. In fact, there are some similar 
expressions between the two texts—e.g., the tripartite conception of the human soul as 
vegetal, animal, and rational (cf. De vulgari eloquentia 2.2 and Convivio 3.2). However, 
there are certainly important inconsistencies between the texts in certain specific areas. 
For a discussion of these, see Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo, Introduction and Notes to De vul­
gari eloquentia in Opere minori, tomo ii, ed. P.V. Mengaldo et alia (Milan, 1979), pp. 6–7; 
Ileana Pagani, La teoria linguistic di Dante (Naples, 1982), pp. 152–54; and Stefano Rizzo, “Il 
De vulgari eloquentia e l’unità del pensiero linguistic di Dante,” Dante Studies 87 (1969), 
69–88. Nevertheless, both at a fundamental level and as pertaining to this essay, I believe 
that the Convivio and De vulgari eloquentia depend upon fundamentally compatible eth-
ico-political philosophies and so permit a synthetic treatment of his philosophy of lan-
guage and political philosophy.
17 Italian references to Convivio follow the Edizione Nazionale sponsored by the Società 
Dantesca Italiana, ed. Franca Brambilla Ageno (Florence, 1995); this edition can be found 
online at the Princeton Dante Project website. Translations are those of Christopher Ryan 
(Stanford, 1989).
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li colpi del martello cagione [instrumentale] del coltello, e l’anima del 
fabro è cagione efficiente e movente; e così non forza, ma ragione, 
[e ragione] ancora divina, [conviene] essere stata principio dello romano 
imperio.
the blows of the hammer are a cause of the knife, but the mind of the 
smith is the efficient or moving cause. So, too, reason not force, and 
indeed divine reason, must be regarded as the source of Roman rule or 
empire. [4.4.12]18
As evidence for this claim, Dante provides two arguments to show that this 
single providential structure is the common basis for the legitimacy of both 
temporal and spiritual authority. First, he argues that, after the fall of man, 
when God wanted “l’umana creatura a sé riconformare” (to refashion the 
human creature into a likeness of Himself once again 4.5.3), the earth had to 
become perfectly disposed for the coming of Christ, and this required two 
things: a political community, namely Rome, that would bring about this dis-
position and
una progenie santissima, della quale dopo molti meriti nascesse una 
femmina ottima di tutte l’altre, la quale fosse camera del Figliuolo di Dio: 
e questa progenie fu quella di David, del qual discese la baldezza e l’onore 
dell’umana generazione, cioè Maria.
a family-line of the highest sanctity, into which, after it had boasted 
many members of great virtue, would be born a woman surpassing all 
others, who would be the resting place of the Son of God. This was the 
line of David, from whom was born the joy and glory of the human race, 
Mary. [4.5.5]
Accordingly, human reason is able to discern in the coincidence of the birth of 
David and the arrival of Aeneas in Italy the fact of “la divina elezione del 
18 In Monarchia, Dante claims that he, like the hypothetical interlocutor of the Convivio, 
once considered the matter only superficially and regarded the Roman people as hav-
ing obtained their authority to rule over all not de jure but merely by force. “But,” he 
states, “medullitus oculos mentis infixi et per efficacissima signa divinam provi-
dentiam hoc effecisse cognovi” (I penetrated with my mind’s eye to the heart of the 
matter and understood through unmistakable signs that this was the work of divine 
 providence [2.1.3]).
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romano imperio” (that the Roman empire was willed by God [4.5.6]). Second, 
claims Dante,
da Romolo cominciando, che fu di quella primo padre, infino alla sua 
perfettissima etade, cioè al tempo del predetto suo imperadore, non pur 
per umane ma per divine operazioni andò lo suo processo.
from the time of its founding father, Romulus, until the age of its highest 
perfection, under the above-mentioned emperor [Ceasar Augustus19], 
was the result of divine, not merely human, activity. [4.5.10]
After all, claims Dante, without God’s direct involvement, it would be impos-
sible to explain the moral uprightness of such an array of civically minded 
leaders (and Dante cites a number of examples that he believes justify this 
claim), as well as the fact that, for instance, the mere cackling of a goose could 
at one point save Rome “quando li Franceschi, tutta Roma presa, prendeano di 
furto Campidoglio di notte” (when the Franks, after capturing the whole of 
Rome, were on the point of capturing the Capitol by stealth under cover of 
darkness [4.5.18]).
In Monarchia, which was written sometime after 1314,20 Dante reiterates 
these latter arguments: that the Romans placed public good above personal 
gain is discussed with similar examples in Monarchia 2.5; that a series of 
portentous events is evidence of divine providence is reiterated in 
Monarchia 2.4. But in Monarchia 2.6–11, Dante offers additional lines of 
argumentation. First, Dante argues that, since the judgment of God can be 
disclosed through contests between many striving for a single prize as well 
as through contests of strength between two champions, Rome’s universal 
19 For Dante, an explicit consequence of this argument is that not only was Rome chosen by 
God, but, since the world could only have been best prepared to receive Christ at the 
specific time of his coming, Rome must also have, at that time, secured the greatest 
degree of peace the world will know until, arguably, after the Last Judgment (see Convivio 
4.5.7–8). Dante also reinforces this point in the Commedia where, in Justinian’s account of 
the history of Rome, the following terzina refers to Augustus: “Con costui corse infino al 
lito rubro; / con costui puose il mondo in tanta pace, / che fu serrate a Giano il suo delu-
bro” (With him it [Rome] raced to the Red Sea; with him it brought the world such peace 
that the temple of Janus was locked [Paradiso 6.79–81]). Commentators are unanimous in 
noting that, for Dante, Augustus shutting the gates of the temple of Janus for only the 
third time in the history of Rome is coincident with the birth of Christ.
20 For a summary of scholarly debates about the dating of the Monarchia see pp. xxxvii–xli 
of Prue Shaw’s introduction to her Cambridge Medieval Classics edition of the Monarchia.
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authority is made manifest by its having won both an athletic contest 
among various rivals for “palmam monarchie” (the palm of monarchy [2.8.8, 
my translation]) as well as having won a duel between two champions. In 
the case of athletic competitions, Dante argues in 2.8 that while many (most 
notably Alexander of Macedonia) had sought to conquer the world, all 
failed but Rome. In the case of contests of strength between two champi-
ons, Dante argues in 2.9 that “Romanus populus per duellum acquisivit 
Imperium” (the Roman people acquired the empire through trial by combat 
[2.9.12]), and he cites many examples of such contests between champions 
decided in Rome’s favor (for example, between Aeneas and Turnus, between 
the Romans and the Albans, between Scipio’s forces and those of Hannibal, 
and so on). From both of these lines of argumentation, Dante concludes 
that Rome acquired rule not merely de facto but de jure and even states at 
the end of the section on duels that this “est principale propositum in libro 
presenti” (is our main thesis in this present book [2.9.21]). Also in both of 
these cases, Dante claims that he argues not from articles of Christian faith 
but from what he regards as “rationalibus principiis” (rational principles 
[2.10.1]) accepted by all people. Thus, in interpreting God’s judgment, 
Christians as well as non-Christians are entitled to use the same evidence: 
Aeneas’s victory over Turnus is of the same variety as David’s over Goliath 
and Hercules’ over Antaeus. The rationalia principia here is that in such 
contests, properly undertaken—for example, in a duel, both parties have to 
be seeking the same end, namely justice, and in an athletic contest both 
parties must abide by the same regulations—God’s judgment, by whatever 
name it is recognized,21 becomes manifest.
While Dante claims that this first line of argumentation establishes Rome’s 
de jure authority by rational principles, he presents additional lines of argu-
ment in Monarchia, 2.10–11, to prove Rome’s authority “ex principiis fidei 
cristiane.” In the first of these, Dante emphasizes especially that he seeks to 
undermine the arguments of those—by whom he means especially the 
popes and those who have supported them in the usurpation of secular 
authority22—who regard themselves as “zelatores fidei cristiane” in their 
21 “Pirrus ‘Heram’ vocabat fortunam, quam causam melius et rectius nos ‘divinam providen-
tiam’ appellamus” (Pyrrhus called Fortune “Hera,” that very cause we name, more cor-
rectly and righteously, “divine providence” [2.9.8]).
22 To some extent the argument may also have been targeted at a traditional, Augustinian 
understanding of the nature of just authority. Anthony Cassell suggests that “Dante’s major 
concern in book 2, although he never names Augustine outright in this connection, is to 
mollify the anti-Roman negativity of that saint’s treatise The City of God, that had narrowed 
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having raged and meditated inane things against the “romanum Principatum” 
(2.10.1). The basic argument of these sections is that Christ himself sanc-
tioned Rome’s authority over all men. The first argument on behalf of this 
claim is that
Sub edicto romane auctoritatis nasci voluit de Virgine Matre, ut in illa 
singulari generis humani descriptione filius Dei, homo factus, homo con-
scriberetur: quod fuit illud prosequi.
Christ chose to be born of his Virgin Mother under an edict emanating 
from Roman authority, so that the Son of God made man might be 
enrolled as a man in that unique census of the human race; this means 
that he acknowledged the validity of that edict. [2.10.6]23
The second argument on behalf of the conclusion that Christ sanctioned the 
authority of Rome is slightly more complicated, but it would also perhaps have 
been more compelling for Dante’s intended audience. In the final section of 
Monarchia 2, Dante argues that for Christ to have suffered for the sins of all 
mankind means that he had to be punished by an authority with jurisdiction 
over all mankind:
Et supra totum humanum genus Tyberius Cesar, cuius vicarius erat 
Pilatus, iurisdictionem non habuisset, nisi romanum Imperium de iure 
fuisset.
and transformed the primitive Christian acquiescence in the ‘powers that be,’ preached by 
both Christ and the Apostle Paul, into antagonism” (The Monarchia Controversy 
[Washington, d.c., 2004], p. 66). Put differently, Augustine does recognize an actual exis-
tence of two structures of authority in the world, but he denigrates the temporal authority 
as illegitimate whereas Dante argues for the providential grounds of temporal authority’s 
legitimacy. But it should also be noted that Dante’s disagreement with Augustine is not 
over the issue of providence, for as Cassell recognizes, Augustine, though he may have 
“derided the ancients for the idolatry that led them to a proud and obsessive pursuit of 
worldly glory through war and gore,” also “proclaimed in City of God 5:21 that ‘the Roman 
rule [Romanum regnum] was established by God, from whom all power comes, and by 
whose providence all things are ruled’” (p. 66, bracketed supplement in Cassell).
23 Dante pushes the argument even further in 2.10.7: “Et forte sanctius est arbitrari divinitus 
iliud exivisse per Cesarem, ut qui tanta tempora fuerat expectatus in sotietate mortalium, 
cum mortalibus ipse se consignaret” (And perhaps it is more holy to believe that the edict 
came by divine inspiration through Caesar, so that he who had been so long awaited in 
the society of men might himself be enrolled among mortals).
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And Tiberius Caesar, whose representative Pilate was, would not have 
had jurisdiction over the whole of mankind unless the Roman empire 
had existed by right. [2.11.5]
Anthony Cassell has addressed a number of these arguments in detail in The 
Monarchia Controversy. According to him, Dante’s arguments concerning the 
de jure authority of Rome are, for the most part, validly constructed even if 
based on faulty or arbitrary premises. However, Cassell gives greater attention 
to the arguments from principles of faith regarding Christ’s sanctioning the 
Roman Empire both by his birth and by his death. According to Cassell, these 
arguments rely on rhetorically persuasive enthymemes that suppress anteced-
ents such as “the birth of Christ signified approval” and “whatever Christ suf-
fered as punishment he approved” (Cassell, p. 79). Yet, even excepting these 
latter arguments of Monarchia, one has the sense that Cassell’s basic attitude 
toward all of Dante’s arguments concerning the nature of divine providence 
might best be summed up when he writes: “It is hard today not to see the poet’s 
instances as preposterously quaint even while we inevitably admire the inten-
sity of his personal persuasion. His arguments have, after all, nothing to do 
with claims of using the light of human reason or even of adducing credible 
authority” (p. 70).24
While I do not wish to imply that I regard Dante’s arguments as compelling 
(especially regarding the truth of the premises from which his demonstrations 
proceed), it is more important, for my purposes, to understand why Dante 
himself believed the arguments to be sound, especially in the cases of those 
arguments that Dante insists are constructed from “rational principles” rather 
than those he acknowledges to have been demonstrated from articles of 
Christian faith. Doing so, I believe, requires attending to the understanding of 
history subtending Dante’s arguments.25
24 The comment is made specifically in relation to Dante’s argument that portentous events 
signify the hand of God at work in the growth of Rome; however, I think the tone of the 
comment basically captures Cassell’s attitude toward the majority of Dante’s arguments 
about divine providence.
25 An alternative way to account for Dante’s understanding of the soundness of his method 
of argumentation (which I shall not discuss in this essay) would involve examining, for 
instance, the discussion between the pilgrim and Saint Peter in Paradiso 24. In this canto, 
Dante is “tested” on the fundamentals of the nature of faith and its role in theological 
argumentation. He responds to Peter’s question about why “faith” is regarded as a sub-
stance: “E io apresso: ‘Le profonde cose / che mi largiscon qui la lor parvenza, / a li occhi 
di là giù son sì ascose, / che l’esser loro v’è in sola credenza, / sopra la qual si fonda l’alta 
spene; / e però di sustanza prende intenza. / E da questa credenza ci convene / silogizzar, 
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As Jacob Klein has pointed out in his essay “History and the Liberal Arts,” 
“the primary liberal disciplines listed by Dante in Convivio and linked to the ten 
heavens of the world…are Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, Arithmetic, Geometry, 
Music, Astronomy, Physics and Metaphysics, Ethics, Theology. History is not 
one of them.”26 Accordingly, Dante’s understanding of the subject matter of 
history is certainly a pre-modern one. However, it would be a mistake to think 
that Dante has no distinct view about the subject matter of history. Rather, 
Dante’s view of history resembles Aristotle’s since, as Klein explains,
History in this sense is founded on completely ‘unhistorical’ points of 
view. That is why this kind of history writing does not constitute a spe-
cific domain like physics or even poetry. Note that Aristotle, the great 
systematizer of human knowledge, in the face of such history—the only 
one he knew—did not treat it as a pragmateia, a discipline in its own 
right. (p. 130)
According to such an understanding, Dante interprets the events of mundane 
or temporal history as symbols of the moral and spiritual development of 
humankind. Thus, for instance, “Troy and its destruction are symbols of man’s 
pride and man’s fall” (Klein, p. 132).27 And, to this extent, like Aristotle’s under-
standing of history, Dante’s history is, as Klein puts it, akin to history of the 
“pragmatic and genealogical kinds” (pp. 132–133), which are, in the case of 
pragmatic history, attempts to “measure the significance and importance of 
events” “by the desire to derive a lesson for the future either from mistakes and 
failures or from exemplary actions in the past” or, in the case of genealogical 
history, attempts to measure the significance and importance of events “by the 
consideration of the present state of affairs, the salient features of which want 
sanz’ avere altra vista: / però intenza d’argomento tene’” (And I responded: “The profound 
things that appear to me here, are so concealed from the eyes below that they exist in 
belief alone, and on that belief is founded the high hope; and therefore this belief refers 
to substance. And from this belief, without having another view, we must assent to syllo-
gisms; therefore, it refers to argument” [70–78]). In short, Dante claims that faith, because 
it intends substance, may be utilized as a first principle in demonstrative arguments. 
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica ii–ii, q4, a1.
26 “History and the Liberal Arts”, in Lectures and Essays, eds. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott 
Zuckerman (Annapolis, 1985), pp. 127–138 (133). In Convivio, see 2.13.
27 Although dramatic elements in the Divine Comedy support this interpretation insofar as 
speakers describe historical examples, an obvious confirmation of Klein’s interpretation 
would seem to be the divinely-carved exempla of historical virtues and vices in Purgatorio 
10 and 12.
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to be traced back to their origins” (p. 129). To the extent that history is employed 
in either of these ways, history is, according to Klein, understood to provide the 
pragmata relevant to narrating or symbolizing matters under consideration 
within another discipline (pragmateia), and this employment is especially per-
tinent with respect to the highest of the disciplines which are, by their nature, 
most distant from immediate experience.
Of these two modes of historical investigation, pragmatic history is espe-
cially pertinent to Dante’s thought since, to quote Klein once again, “as far as 
pragmatic history is concerned, the selection is based on our sense of moral 
virtues or our understanding of practical maxims of conduct” (p. 130). History, 
in this sense, serves a practical end, and, in the disciplines of ethics and theol-
ogy, it serves as the signs with which Dante, like his own guide Virgil, guides his 
readers to a state of ethical and spiritual perfection. In short, Dante’s “history” 
is a tool of dialectical inquiry or rhetorical or poetic production,28 and it oper-
ates through allegorical interpretation. To the extent that Dante’s view would 
permit history to function pragmatically not merely for ethics (which Aristotle 
allows) but also for theology (which Aristotle to some extent rejects—see, for 
instance, the last paragraph of Metaphysics Λ.8), his view would, of course, 
28 For Dante, dialectical inquiry supplies first principles of a science since, following 
Aristotle, he maintains that “verum, quia omnis veritas que non est principium ex veritate 
alicuius principii fit manifesta, necesse est in qualibet inquistione habere notitiam de 
principio, in quod analectice recurratur pro certituine omnium propositionum que infer-
ius assummuntur. Et quia presens tractatus est inquisitio quedam, ante omnia de prin-
cipio scruptandum esse videntur in cuius virtute inferiora consistant” (since every truth 
which is not itself a first [that is, indemonstrable] principle must be demonstrated with 
reference to the truth of some first principle, it is necessary in any inquiry to know the 
first principle to which we refer back in the course of strict deductive argument in order 
to ascertain the truth of all the propositions which are advanced later. And since this 
present treatise is a kind of inquiry, we must at the outset investigate the principle whose 
truth provides a firm foundation for later propositions [Monarchia 1.2.4]). Thus, although 
Dante does not explicitly state that his inquiry is dialectical, his method is rooted in the 
rubric for this kind of inquiry laid out in the Topics, where Aristotle plainly states: “dialec-
tic, being exploratory, is the path to the principles of every inquiry” (in Aristotle: Selected 
Works, 3rd edition, trans. and ed. Hippocrates Apostle and Lloyd Gerson [Grinnell, Iowa, 
1991], A.2, 101b4). In discussing the letter to Cangrande della Scala and De vulgari eloquen­
tia below, I will explain Dante’s understanding of how a principle, once grasped, may 
subsequently guide productive (e.g., poetic or rhetorical) and practical (e.g., ethical, or 
political) activities. For now it suffices to note that, for Dante, when ruled by intellect 
(specifically, by the possession of a principle), poetic language and rhetoric may help pro-
duce desirable political ends such as a universal monarchy. Concerning Dante’s familiar-
ity with Aristotle’s Organon, see Cassell, pp. 27–33.
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depart from Aristotle’s. However, the more significant departure from Aristotle 
is not in mobilizing historical allegoresis on behalf of theology, but in the 
underlying understanding of the very activity of historical allegoresis.
Irrespective of its authenticity, the famous letter to Cangrande della Scala29 
provides an important insight into Dante’s understanding of the proper alle-
gorical employment of history. In section  7 of this letter, the letter’s author 
explains that, with respect to its service to practical ends, “history” must be 
understood in more than one way, for although various kinds of “sensus mystici 
variis appellentur nominibus, generaliter omnes dici possunt allegorici, cum 
sint a litterali sive historiali diversi” (mystical meanings are called by various 
names, they may one and all in a general sense be termed allegorical, inasmuch 
as they are different from the literal or historical, § 22, emphasis mine).30 In short, 
Dante’s notion of history is, like his own Divine Comedy, “polysemos” (polyse-
mous) in that its “primus sensus est qui habetur per litteram, alius est qui hab-
etur per significata per litteram” (first meaning is that which is conveyed by the 
letter, and the next is that which is conveyed by what the letter signifies, § 20). 
Accordingly, to the extent that the literal sense of the Divine Comedy is “status 
animarum post mortem simpliciter sumptus” (the state of the souls after death, 
pure and simple, § 24), the Divine Comedy’s “history” records the placement of 
the souls of those who had died prior to approximately 1300, though it must be 
accepted that Dante regards such a literal sense, even if “historical,” as fictive as 
well as poetic.31 But the allegorical “subject” of the Divine Comedy “est homo 
29 The question of this letter’s authenticity continues to be hotly debated. For recent discus-
sions, see Robert Hollander’s Dante’s Epistle to Cangrande (Ann Arbor, 1993) and Seminario 
Dantesco Internazionale. International Dante Seminar 1, Proceedings of the First Congress 
at the Chauncey Conference Center, Princeton, October 21–23, 1994, ed. Z.G. Baranski 
(Florence, 1997). In any case, insofar as the letter is relevant to this essay, its arguments are 
roughly consistent with (though more detailed than) those offered in the first book of 
Convivio, so there is little reason for me to attempt any adjudication of the matter here.
30 Latin references and section numbers follow the Testo critico della Società Dantesca 
Italiana, ed. Ermenegildo Pistelli (Florence, 1960). This edition can be found online at the 
Princeton Dante Project website. Unless otherwise noted, translations are from Dantis 
Alagherii Epistolae, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Paget Toynbee (Oxford, 1966).
31 On the various aspects of the allegorical form of the Commedia, see § 27 of this letter. I see 
no reason to believe that Dante actually made a journey into the afterlife (nor, for that 
matter, to believe that Dante himself believed he had made such a journey, nor even that 
he believed he had received an epiphantic mystical vision). On the contrary, his “histori-
cal” narration must be regarded as fictive even if supporting a treatment that is also 
“definitive, analytical, probative, refutative, and exemplificative” (diffinitivus, divisivus, 
probativus, improbativus, et exemplorum positivus). In fact, this explains why Dante 
relates “encounters” with non-human or quasi-human souls who are known only through 
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prout merendo et demerendo per arbitrii libertatem iustitie premiandi et 
 puniendi obnoxius est” (is man as he is deserving of reward or punishment by 
justice according to merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will, § 25). 
Thus, as the letter’s author explains in section 39, “finis totius et partis est remo-
vere viventes in hac vita de statu miserie et perducere ad statum felicitates” (the 
aim of the whole and of the part is to remove those living in this life from a state 
of misery and to bring them to a state of happiness). And, as he explains in the 
following section, consistent with this finis, the branch of philosophy to which 
the Divine Comedy’s history (in its allegorical employment) belongs is that of 
“morale negotium, sive ethica” (morals or ethics).32
In relation to this allegorical practice, the distance between Dante and 
Aristotle is therefore plain if we attend to a feature of Dante’s argument that 
draws its force initially from a reference to Aristotle. In Convivio 4.5, as I have 
already noted, Dante explains that one of the best pieces of evidence that 
Rome was intended to rule by divine providence is that such a state of affairs 
would have most perfectly prepared mankind to receive Christ. Here Dante 
draws upon an argument he had made in Convivio 4.2.5 to the effect that, in 
order to understand matters properly, “quel tempo in tutte le nostre operazioni 
si dee attendere” (we should in all our actions wait for the right time). For 
Dante, this conclusion is explicitly warranted by the fact that Aristotle himself 
defines time in Physics Δ as “‘Numero di movimento secondo prima e poi,’ e 
‘numero di movimento celestiale’” (“number of motion with respect to before 
and after,” and “number of celestial movement,” my translation), but which, 
according to Dante in the very same sentence, means that time “dispone le 
cose di qua giù diversamente a ricevere alcuna informazione” (disposes things 
here below to receive information in diverse ways [4.2.6, translation mine]).
But despite the ostensive references to Aristotle’s Physics, there is a distinctly 
non-Aristotelian metaphysical understanding of human reason at work here. 
First, at the very beginning of Monarchia 2.6, the section in which Dante begins 
myths (e.g., the “giants” of Inferno 31) as well as those who are known through historical or 
quasi-historical accounts and those whom Dante knew personally in his own lifetime.
32 Toynbee translates morale negotium as “morals” in this section and moralis neogtii as “eth-
ics” in § 10 (§ 3 in Toynbee’s divisions). Given Klein’s discussion of pragmateia above, note 
that, at the earlier instance of the term negotium, Toynbee explains: “negotium is the ren-
dering in the Antiqua Translatio of the Ethics of the term πραγματεία” (n. 5, pp. 169–170). 
It should therefore be kept in mind that the connotations of both morales negotium and 
ethica are both different and somewhat broader in meaning than the English terms 
“morals” and “ethics” and that the author of the letter to Can Grande likely has in mind a 
philosophical “discipline” that involves the sorts of topics that are discussed in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.
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to lay out his “historical” arguments for the independence of Roman authority 
from the spiritual authority of the Church, Dante states:
Et illud quod natura ordinavit, de iure servatur: natura enim in provi-
dendo non deficit ab hominis providentia, quia si deficeret, effectus 
superaret causam in bonitate: quod est inpossibile.
Besides it is right to preserve what nature has ordained, for nature in the 
measures it takes is no less provident than man; if it were so, the effect 
would surpass its cause in goodness, which is impossible. [2.6.1]
Second, in Paradiso 27, Dante also makes clear that all motions (both temporal 
and eternal) are related to a single common measure in the movements of the 
Primum Mobile:
E questo cielo non ha altro dove
che la mente divina, in che s’accende
l’amor che ’l volge e la virtù ch’ei piove.
Luce e amor d’un cerchio lui comprende,
sì come questo li altri; e quel precinto
colui che ’l cinge solamente intende.
Non è suo moto per altro distinto,
ma li altri son mensurati da questo,
sì come diece da mezzo e da quinto.
And this heaven has no other where than the divine mind in which are 
enkindled the love that turns it and the power it rains down. Light and 
love encompass it in a circle just as it does the others; and that enclosure 
only the one who encloses understands. Its motion is not marked by 
another’s, but from it the others are measured just as ten is from a half 
and a fifth. [109–117]33
Moreover, in Convivio’s discussion of the Primum Mobile, Dante claims that 
without this common measure for the motion of all the other spheres,
Non sarebbe quaggiù generazione né vita d’animale o di pianta; notte 
non sarebbe né die, né settimana né mese né anno, ma tutto l’universo 
sarebbe disordinato, e lo movimento delli altri sarebbe indarno.
33 This understanding of the “movement” of the Primum Mobile most resembles what 
Aristotle seems to have in mind when he discusses eternal motion.
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There would be no generation here below, either of animal or of plant 
life; there would be no night or day, or week or month or year, but rather 
all the universe would be disordered, and the movement of the other 
heavens would be in vain. [2.14.17]
Now, it would be more surprising if Dante, firmly in the tradition of Christian 
neo-Platonism, were not to associate the ends of Nature with the Good, how-
ever un-Aristotelian this may be. But what is relatively new34 in this formula-
tion of history is a secularization of understanding of divine providence 
according to which history becomes a subject of allegorical interpretation in 
light of distinctly human ends. Put differently, for Dante, the order of nature 
and God’s will are coextensive, and the mundane world is ordered in such a 
way as to prepare mankind for its moral and spiritual perfection. But the order 
of nature is understood by humans only in relation to their own distinct tem-
poral and spiritual ends. Accordingly, Dante’s understanding of history, by 
stressing the context through which all mundane events may be interpreted, 
requires a metaphysical grounding for the conclusion that what occurs natu-
rally is “preserved” de jure and knowable through “rational principles.”
It is not the practice of allegoresis that is new in the Renaissance, let alone 
in Dante’s thought; rather, what is new in Dante’s philosophy is that allegoresis, 
as applied to both the temporal and spiritual human ends, has turned from the 
objective representation of historical events to the subjective interpretation of 
the context of history. It is possible for Dante to reconstruct and interpret the 
past in such a way as to lead others to natural and supernatural perfection only 
to the extent that nature itself has prepared him in his own “proper moment” 
to understand its innermost causes. To one who is unprepared to understand 
the innermost causes of things, the events of mundane history might appear to 
be merely a de facto procession of chance. But to one who is properly disposed 
by history itself to understand the innermost causes of things, the events of 
mundane history are recognized as the de jure unfolding of divine providence 
ordering all things toward the same universal end.
It should now be clear why the enthymemes that Cassell regards as merely 
rhetorical or eristic in Dante’s arguments regarding the evidence for divine 
providence have already, for Dante, been grounded by this peculiar under-
standing of history as a context of interpretation in which both the natural and 
the supernatural human ends can come to be unified and understood most 
34 According to Walter Ullmann, Dante’s predecessors in this regard would include Otto of 
Freising and William of Malmesbury (see Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism 
[Ithaca, 1977], pp. 64–67).
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fully. So as long as one accepts the arguments that the significant and unique 
human ends are temporal and spiritual perfection, the historical evidence, 
however arbitrary it may seem, is ordered de jure in light of these ends. As a 
consequence, Cassell’s judgment that Dante cannot reasonably expect his 
readers to accept an enthymeme involving a suppressed antecedent that Christ 
sanctioned his own crucifixion cannot be correct. To the contrary, it is all too 
clear that Dante does not regard, nor does he expect his readers to regard, such 
a premise as dubitable in any way. With respect to both temporal and spiritual 
ends, it is necessary that Christ did condone his own suffering and that the 
event is an expression of justice; otherwise one would have to deny what Dante 
assumes to be the inevitable truth that divine reason caused these events in 
order to make human perfection possible through its own nature. It is only 
when such events are abstracted from their precise order in nature, that is, 
abstracted from time itself, that they appear to be contingent and unjust.
 Conclusion
In short, then, both Dante’s political philosophy and his philosophy of lan-
guage are tied to a common understanding of the nature of divine providence. 
Dante’s political philosophy does not merely hold that divine providence is the 
common ground of both temporal and spiritual authority. Rather, Dante also 
maintains that the very grounds for the legitimacy of a sovereign can only be 
measured by one who attends to that sovereign’s specific and local significance 
in the providential ordering of human history. Moreover, this understanding of 
political legitimacy is also embedded in Dante’s philosophy of language since 
Dante’s conception of the illustrious vernacular is constrained by the compet-
ing demands that it both help produce justice in a local environment and that 
it derive its authority from its universal suitability.
In light of these comments, then, it is clear that Dante’s understanding of 
divine providence continually opens onto the aporetic relationship between 
the temporal function of the illustrious vernacular and its atemporally deter-
mined authority to perform this function. On the one hand, Dante explicitly 
maintains that the significance of singular historical events or the value of par-
ticular modes of expression can only be interpreted or judged in relation to 
their unique historico-political contexts. Moreover, he seems to acknowledge 
that conditions that might produce justice in one context are local, unique, and 
non-transferrable to another context. On the other hand, Dante persistently 
seeks a universal ground for the authority to judge and interpret these events 
and modes of expression. The principle that establishes such a jurisdiction is 
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cosmological in that it understands history as the unfolding of particular con-
texts of signification in relation to divine providence. Thus the legacy of 
Christo-Platonism in Dante’s thought is clearly expressed in the statement 
quoted above that the ultimate grounds for the legitimacy of human judgment 
“flows down…without any intermediary from the Fountainhead of universal 
authority” (Monarchia 3.16.15).
What is new, though, in Dante’s understanding is the way in which this 
providential ground for secular authority operates in relation not only to the 
spiritual ends of the human being but also in relation to the earthly ends of 
human nature. Or, in other words, Dante seems to embrace a tension between 
two major modes in the prior history of philosophy. On the one hand, he 
embraces elements of an Aristotelian ethico-political philosophy that empha-
sizes the importance of the temporal ends of human activity and that to some 
extent undermines the significance of divine providence in legitimizing those 
activities. On the other hand, he is also deeply committed to a Christo-Platonic 
psychology and metaphysics in which a predominant conception of the role of 
divine providence makes very few concessions to the legitimacy of historical 
and cultural differentiation.
In light of this tension within his thinking, I would like to close by suggest-
ing that, with respect to later philosophies of history that might bear some 
resemblance to Dante’s peculiar understanding, what may be considered dis-
tinctly “modern” is: (a) that Dante understands history as a realm of inquiry in 
which the significance of mundane events is interpreted in relation to the total 
context of history in which they are embedded and (b) that, for Dante, such an 
interpretation is made possible only by virtue of a universal metaphysical prin-
ciple that secures a common measure in relation to which these events may be 
judged. For Dante, this common measure is itself always linked to the particu-
lar point of view of the individual for whom it is appropriate to interpret his-
tory allegorically or, what may be the same thing, to produce virtue in others 
through poetic expression. It may therefore be appropriate to think that 
Dante’s understanding of the proper grounds for individual authority might 
also be viewed as a prototype of the modern “subject” since the principles by 
which such an individual authority judges are authoritative for that subject 
only to the extent that they are, in principle, common to all by nature.
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